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I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change and shifting weather patterns affect the development
and distribution of insects and other pests.1 Public agencies as well as
private parties, such as farmers and ranchers, commonly use chemical
and biological pesticides to combat the spread and entrenchment of these
nuisances.2 Given the ubiquitous use of pesticides, it is not surprising
that pesticide regulation involves important issues of law and public
policy.
Aquatic pesticide control often includes broadcast spraying of
chemicals or biological materials to kill targeted pests in, near, or over
waterbodies or wetlands.3 Public health officials, for example, use this
approach to prevent or to respond to mosquitos carrying West Nile virus
and other disease-bearing pests.4 Pesticide spraying is also used to
combat numerous other types of invasive species that threaten valuable
natural resources.
Chemicals are the main component of most aquatic pesticides.5
Pesticides inevitably reach beyond their immediate target, and this
spillover affects the surrounding environment. For example, pesticides
used to control mosquitos typically are applied to breeding habitat areas
as an ultra-low-volume spray, either by truck-mounted equipment or from
fixed-wing or rotary aircraft. Thermal fog applications are also used in
some areas. Barrier treatments, which may be applied as high volume
liquids with handheld spray equipment using compounds with residual
characteristics, also are common in some U.S. locations.6

1. Throughout this Article, the term “pest” broadly includes any insect,
rodent, nematode, fungus, weed, or other form of aquatic or terrestrial plant.
2. The term “pesticide” broadly includes any substance or mixture of substances
intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, as well as any substance
or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant.
3. Aquatic pesticide use is distinguishable from terrestrial pesticide use. As a
practical matter, however, the application of pesticides to land may affect nearby
waterbodies through runoff.
4. See, e.g., County of San Diego, West Nile Virus, http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/
deh/pests/wnv.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
5. MARVIN J. LEVINE, PESTICIDES: A TOXIC TIME BOMB IN OUR MIDST 14 (2007).
6. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, materials labeled
for mosquito larviciding include:
[T]he organophosphate temephos (Abate); several biological larvicides such as
Bacillus thuringiensis israelensis (Bti, a bacterial larvicide), Bacillus sphaericus;
methoprene, an insect growth regulator (e.g., Altosid); several larvicidal oils (e.g.,
petroleum-based Golden Bear and mineral-based Bonide) and monomolecular
surface films (e.g., Agnique, Arosurf); and in some limited habitats diflubenzuron
(e.g., Dimilin, a chitin synthesis inhibitor).
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In Altman v. Town of Amherst, the Second Circuit pressed the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to clarify its legal position on
the regulation of aquatic pesticides.7 On November 27, 2006, the EPA
responded by issuing its final aquatic pesticide rule.8 It superseded the
EPA’s previously published Interim and Final Interpretative Statements.9
In formulating the rule, the EPA considered a wide range of comments
from interested parties, including pesticide manufacturers and applicators,
public health control agencies, state agricultural and environmental

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, EPIDEMIC/EPIZOOTIC WEST NILE VIRUS IN THE
UNITED STATES: GUIDELINES FOR SURVEILLANCE, PREVENTION, AND CONTROL 30 (2003),
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvbid/westnile/resources/wnv-guidelines-aug-2003.
pdf. “Adulticides labeled for mosquito control include several organophosphates such as
malathion and naled. Some natural pyrethrins and synthetic pyrethroids (permethrin,
resmethrin and sumithrin) also hold adulticide labels.” Id. at 31.
7. Altman v. Town of Amherst, 47 F. App’x 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (“Until the
EPA articulates a clear interpretation of current law—among other things, whether properly
used pesticides released into or over waters of the United States can trigger the requirement
for NPDES permits (i.e., an SPDES permit in Amherst)—the question of whether properly
used pesticides can become pollutants that violate the CWA will remain open.”).
8. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122). This
pesticide rule was scheduled to become effective on January 26, 2007. Id. at 69,622 (Dec. 1,
2006). Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(h), the following do not require an NPDES:
The application of pesticides consistent with all relevant requirements
under FIFRA (i.e., those relevant to protecting water quality), in the
following two circumstances:
(1) The application of pesticides directly to waters of the United States
in order to control pests. Examples of such applications include
applications to control mosquito larvae, aquatic weeds, or other pests
that are present in waters of the United States.
(2) The application of pesticides to control pests that are present over
waters of the United States, including near such waters, where a portion
of the pesticides will unavoidably be deposited to waters of the
United States in order to target the pests effectively; for example,
when insecticides are aerially applied to a forest canopy where
waters of the United States may be present below the canopy or
when pesticides are applied over or near water for control of adult
mosquitoes or other pests.
40 C.F.R. § 122.3(h) (2009). The action was rulemaking under the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
9. Interim Statement and Guidance on Application of Pesticides to Waters of the
United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 68 Fed. Reg. 48,385 (proposed Aug. 13,
2003); Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 70 Fed. Reg. 5093 (proposed Feb. 1, 2003).
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agencies, environmental groups, human health advocates, farming
interests, and other members of the public.10
The final rule provided that the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit program11 of the Federal Clean
Water Act (CWA)12 did not apply to chemical or biological pesticides
applied to, over, or near waters of the United States so long as the
pesticide application complied with the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).13 The EPA administers both the CWA
and FIFRA.14
The rule came under widespread legal attack by both industry and
environmental groups. Environmental groups argued that the exemption
violated the CWA requirements on the discharge of pollutants as well as
the Administrative Procedure Act, which prohibits agency action that is
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.15 Industry groups
complained that the rule was too prohibitive and overreaching.
Legal challenges to the final rule were filed by interested parties in the
D.C., First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits.16 In 2007, a multidistrict litigation panel
consolidated the challenges in the Sixth Circuit in National Cotton
Council of America v. EPA.17 The decision is nationally important to
regulators, the pesticide industry, and environmentalists.

10. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487.
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
12. Id. §§ 1251–1387.
13. See Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance
with FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,485–86; see also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006). The EPA advanced a similar exemption
argument in Washington Toxics Coalition v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032–33 (9th Cir.
2005), which found that compliance with FIFRA did not exempt the EPA from
complying with the consultation provisions of section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act with respect to the use of streamside pesticides.
14. The EPA’s aquatic pesticide rule does not prevent a state from using its
independent authority to limit the use of a particular pesticide to address local water
quality issues, so long as the exercise does not conflict with federal law.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
16. See Karen M. Hansen & Ami M. Grace-Tardy, Diminishing Deference: How
and Why the Courts Are Increasingly Declining To Defer to EPA NPDES Decisions and
Policies, 2 E. WATER L. & POL’Y REP. 55, 58 (2007); see also Larry Pearl, Groups File
Competing Lawsuits Challenging EPA Pesticide Rule, PESTICIDE & TOXIC CHEMICAL
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2006, reprinted in PESTICIDE REP., Feb. 2007, at 5, 5–6, available at
http://pested.okstate.edu/pestrep/feb07pr.pdf. The lawsuits were filed under the administrative
procedure and judicial review provision of the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1).
17. 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009).
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In January 2009, a three-judge panel from the Sixth Circuit vacated
the EPA’s final rule.18 Six months later, in June 2009, the court granted
the EPA a two-year stay of its mandate to give the EPA the chance to go
back to the regulatory drawing board.19 During the stay, the EPA plans
to issue a general NPDES permit consistent with the court’s decision.20
As a practical matter, the decision means that the regulated community
will be required to apply for general permit coverage when it becomes
available, and to comply with the permit’s monitoring and discharge
provisions. During the stay, the EPA plans to assist those states authorized
to administer the NPDES program in developing their NPDES permits
and in providing outreach and education to the regulated community.21
Regulators, environmental interest groups, and the regulated community
will be closely following the EPA’s response to the court’s decision.
Given the environmental stakes and the court’s flawed reasoning,
additional legal challenges are apt to follow.
In reaching its decision, the Sixth Circuit focused on the language of
the CWA that regulates “‘any addition of any pollutant to navigable

18. Id. at 940.
19. See U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES),
Court Grants EPA 2-Year Stay (June 12, 2009), http://cfpub1.epa.gov/npdes/home.cfm?
program_id=41#stay.
20. Id. California’s general permit for aquatic pesticides, which was suspended
pending the outcome in National Cotton Council, may influence the EPA. See STATE
WATER RES. CONTROL BD., FACT SHEET: WATER QUALITY ORDER NO. 2004-0008-DWQ
(2004), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/adopted_orders/
water_quality/2004/wqo/wqo2004-0008.pdf (vector control); STATE WATER RES. CONTROL
BD., FACT SHEET: WATER QUALITY ORDER NO. 2004-0009-DWQ (2004), available at
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/board_decisions/adopted_orders/water_quality/
2004/wqo/wqo2004-0009.pdf (aquatic weed control). In January 2007, the chief counsel
to the State Water Resources Control Board advised:
The State Water Board should maintain the permits pending any final judicial
actions on the regulation. The State Water Board should forego taking any formal
action to rescind the permits, but publicize the regulation and allow any dischargers
who wish to, to file a notice of termination. This would immediately allow
dischargers to terminate coverage, along with the obligation to conduct monitoring,
pay fees, etc. Dischargers should also be informed that there is a legal challenge to
the regulation.
Memorandum from Michael A.M. Lauffer, Chief Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel,
State Water Res. Control Bd., to Tom Howard, Acting Executive Dir., State Water Res.
Control Bd. 5 (Jan. 2, 2007), available at http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/
programs/npdes/docs/aquatic/memorandum.pdf.
21. U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), supra
note 19.
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waters from any point source.’”22 Under the CWA, the discharge of “any”
pollutant to navigable waters is prohibited unless it complies with the
NPDES permit provisions of the statute.23
The CWA defines the term “pollutant” to include, among other
categories, “chemical wastes” as well as “biological materials.”24 Although
pesticides are not specifically identified, the term pollutant has been
broadly construed by some federal courts to include “all foreign
substances” not expressly exempted from coverage.25
Congress intentionally defined the term pollutant broadly so as to
avoid litigation over whether the discharges of particular materials are
subject to NPDES requirements. Congress’s intent is revealed in the
following:
For the first time, the Committee would add to the law a definition of the term
pollutant. In order to trigger the control requirements over addition of materials
to the navigable water, waters of the contiguous zone, and the ocean, it is
necessary to define such materials so that litigable issues are avoided over the
question of whether the addition of a particular material is subject to control
requirements.26

The intent to expansively define the term pollutant is further evidenced
by the fact that the CWA contains two specific exemptions within the
definition itself, one for “sewage from vessels” and the other for materials
associated with the secondary recovery of oil or gas production.27
Neither exemption from the definition of a pollutant includes pesticides.
According to the EPA’s final rule, those chemical pesticides applied in
compliance with the “relevant requirements” of FIFRA should not be
considered pollutants on the theory they are beneficial products and
therefore do not fit within the category of chemical wastes.28 Biological
pesticides, the EPA reasoned, also should not be treated as pollutants
because they do not fit within the category of biological materials.29 If
22. Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 939 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A)
(2006)).
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006).
24. Id. § 1362(6).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110 n.4 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing
United States v. Pa. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 671 (1973)).
26. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 76 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668,
3742.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
28. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,486 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
122). A FIFRA labeling requirement governing application rates or dilution requirements is
related to water quality, whereas the FIFRA requirement that the person mixing the
pesticide wear protective clothing, while a violation, is not related to water quality. Id.
29. Id.
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chemical pesticides are not pollutants, the EPA reasoned, biological
pesticides should not be considered pollutants.30 In its view, the two
categories should be treated similarly. The EPA maintained that, as
directed by Congress, it was simply interpreting the meaning of the term
pollutant, and that the final rule did not violate the CWA by
impermissibly exempting from regulation congressionally established
categories of discharge.31 But others disagreed with this conclusion.
The core of the legal dispute in National Cotton Council was whether
the term pollutant, as used by Congress in the CWA, includes chemical
and biological pesticides when they are applied to waters of the United
States, including wetlands.32 Although the Sixth Circuit vacated the
EPA’s final rule, the important point of disagreement for purposes of
this Article is the court’s position that the CWA does not apply to all
chemical pesticides.33 The Sixth Circuit’s conclusion is too narrow an
interpretation of the law.
All aquatic chemical pesticides arguably result in “waste” because
they inexorably reach beyond the intended target. This spillover effect
to the environment at the time of application constitutes waste. In
addition, all chemical pesticides arguably fit within the broad statutory
meaning of pollutant because they necessarily change the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the waterbody.34 Impacting the
aquatic environment in this manner is consistent with the view that the
chemical pesticide constitutes the discharge of a pollutant.
The view that all chemical pesticides are subject to NPDES regulation
is buttressed by the policy underlying the CWA. Regulating all of the
chemical pesticides that enter this nation’s waters is critical to protecting
water quality, which is the purpose of the CWA.35 The NPDES program
is potentially the only federal regulatory program for controlling, monitoring,
and tracking the actual use of chemical pesticides. The intended

30. Id.
31. Id. at 68,488.
32. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 742 (2006). The Court in Rapanos
was split 4–1–4. Because no one opinion commanded a majority, the corrected application of
the decision is in doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1216–20
(11th Cir. 2007).
33. See Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 936 (6th Cir. 2009).
34. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text.
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
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beneficial purpose of eradicating or controlling pests does not obviate
the critical need to track the pesticides that enter this nation’s waters.
II. A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND PESTICIDES
For the first time in the history of the world, every human being is now subjected
to contact with dangerous chemicals . . . . They have been recovered from most
of the major river systems and even from streams of groundwater flowing unseen
through the earth. . . . They have entered and lodged in the bodies of fish, birds,
reptiles, and domestic and wild animals so universally that scientists carrying on
animal experiments find it almost impossible to locate subjects free from such
contamination.36

Broadly construed, a pesticide is any agent that is used to kill or
control pests.37 Numerous types of pesticides exist, including insecticides,
herbicides, rodenticides, fungicides, nematicides, acaricides, fumigants,
and plant growth regulators. Broad spectrum pesticides are toxic to a
wide variety of species and organisms, whereas selective pesticides are
directed at a narrowly defined group of pests. Notwithstanding this
system of classification, all types of pesticides impact the environment.
Convincing evidence exists that climate change affects the distribution
as well as the toxicity of chemical pollutants in the environment.38
Biotransformation of organic pollutants both directly and indirectly
affects humans. Increased water temperature can alter the biotransformation
of pesticides into more bioactive metabolites.39 Studies have shown a
positive link between pesticide contamination and storm water runoff.40
One study, for example, describes a fivefold increase in pesticide water
contamination during extreme rainfall events.41

36. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 15–16 (1962).
37. The FIFRA defines the term pesticide as “(1) any substance or mixture of
substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any pest, (2) any
substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or
desiccant, and (3) any nitrogen stabilizer” with the exception of a “new animal drug.”
7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2006).
38. See generally Pamela D. Noyes et al., The Toxicology of Climate Change:
Environmental Contaminants in a Warming World, 35 ENV’T INT’L 971 (2009)
(reviewing the scientific literature for data regarding the effects of climate change on the
distribution and toxicity of chemical pollutants).
39. See Robie Macdonald et al., Contaminant Amplification in the Environment,
36 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 456A (2002).
40. Erica D. Chiovarou & Thomas C. Siewicki, Comparison of Storm Intensity and
Application Timing on Modeled Transport and Fate of Six Contaminants, 389 SCI.
TOTAL ENV’T 87, 99 (2008).
41. B. Burgoa & R.D. Wauchope, Pesticides in Run-Off and Surface Waters, in
ENVIRONMENTAL BEHAVIOUR OF AGROCHEMICALS 221, 240–46 (T.R. Roberts & P.C.
Kearney eds., 1995).
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Common chemical pesticides include polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), polychlorinated dibenzo-p-dioxins (PCDDs), polychlorinated
dibenzofurans (PCDFs), and organochlorine pesticides.42 Concentrations of
these chemicals have been detected in the serum of first-time pregnant
females.43 Additional studies are needed to understand the potential
health consequences to the fetus from exposure to persistent organic
pollutants.44
The health risk to humans from the exposure to chemical pesticides is
an important concern. A cluster of birth defects in North Carolina and
Florida has been reported in the offspring of agricultural workers using
pesticides.45 Exposure to the herbicide paraquat, fungicide maneb, and
organochlorine pesticides, in particularly beta-hexachlorocyclohexane,
has been reported to increase the risk of the chronic motor system
disorder Parkinson’s disease, especially in individuals exposed at a
young age.46 Analysis of the neurotoxic properties of these pesticide
compounds focused on their ability to induce oxidative stress in neural
cells, which may be more vulnerable in developing brains.47 Freya
Kamel, a National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences epidemiologist,
has studied the suspected link between pesticides and Parkinson’s
disease. He predicts that future studies will move toward determining
how genetics affect an individual’s susceptibility to environmental
toxicants.48
Aquatic pesticides, such as 2,4-D, Acrolein, copper sulfate, and
Fluridone, are intentionally applied to or near the water to destroy plants,

42. Richard Y. Wang et al., Serum Concentrations of Selected Persistent Organic
Pollutants in a Sample of Pregnant Females and Changes in Their Concentrations During
Gestation, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1244, 1244 (2009).
43. Id. at 1245–46, 1247 tbl.4.
44. Id. at 1249.
45. Geoffrey M. Calvert & Sheila A. Higgins, Using Surveillance Data To Promote
Occupational Health and Safety Policies and Practice at the State Level: A Case Study,
AM. J. INDUS. MED., May 28, 2009, at 2–3.
46. See generally Jason R. Richardson et al., Elevated Serum Pesticide Levels and
Risk of Parkinson Disease, 66 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 870 (2009); see also Cynthia
Washam, Pesticides: Double Exposure Heightens Parkinson Disease Risk, 117 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. A295, A295 (2009).
47. Miguel A. Ortiz-Ortiz et al., Curcumin Enhances Paraquat-Induced Apoptosis
of N27 Mesencephalic Cells via the Generation of Reactive Oxygen Species, NEURO
TOXICOLOGY, Aug. 4, 2009, at 2, 7, 9.
48. Washam, supra note 46, at A295.
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insects, undesired fish, and other designated pests.49 In order to reach a
critical concentration, pesticides commonly are applied over broad areas
even though the target pest may not be present throughout. Thus, a
notable feature of this type of application, which differs in degree but
not in effect from other regulated pollutants, is their pervasive impact on
nontarget organisms and the natural environment. Not surprisingly,
ubiquitous spillover effects from pesticides are common.50
Pesticides clearly have beneficial uses, such as controlling mosquito
larvae. But not surprisingly, pesticides are intended, at a minimum, to
be toxic to the intended target. Ideally, the pesticide is toxic only so
long as it is necessary to produce the desired result at which time the
pesticide is intended to degrade into nontoxic byproducts. But scientists
know that pesticide disappearance does not match reality. In fact,
pesticide residues have been described by some as “the world’s foremost
pollution problem.”51
The general dangers from pesticides have been known for some time.
In 1962, Rachel Carson sent shockwaves of awareness through the
American consciousness with the publication of her book Silent
Spring.52 She demonstrated how pesticides can have unexpected
impacts on humans and the environment. In her chapter “Rivers of
Death,” for example, Carson examined the threat to the waters of this
nation from pesticides.53
The environmental alarm bell that Carson rang decades ago continues
to ring today.54 Pesticides are known to have long-lasting as well as

49. See generally GEOFFREY S. SIEMERING ET AL., S.F. ESTUARY INST., AQUATIC
PESTICIDE MONITORING PROGRAM FINAL REPORT 1–5 (2005), available at http://www.
sfei.org/apmp/reports/392_APMP_Final%20Report.pdf.
50. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 5.1, at 397–98 (2d ed.
1994).
51. Id. at 398.
52. CARSON, supra note 36.
53. Id. at 120–40. The danger to humans from the ubiquitous use of pesticides
exists. A recent UCLA study, for example, has linked pesticides in private well water to
Parkinson’s disease. Nicole M. Gatto et al., Well Water Consumption and Parkinson’s
Disease in Rural California, 117 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1912, 1916 (2009).
54. In 2009, the EPA proposed spending at least $36 million to clean up the world’s
largest deposit of the banned pesticide DDT, which is located 200 feet underwater off the
California coast of the Palos Verdes Peninsula. Montrose Chemical Corporation
released 110 tons of DDT and 10 tons of toxic PCBs into the sewers from 1947 through
1971. The chemicals then flowed into the ocean, which has resulted in a seventeensquare-mile deposit of pesticide-contaminated sediment. EPA Announces Proposed
Plan, PALOS VERDES SHELF SUPERFUND SITE (U.S. EPA Region 9, S.F., Cal.), June 2009,
available at http://www.epa.gov/region09/superfund/pvshelf/pdf/pvs-proposed-plan-Jun09.pdf.
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unintended effects both on the environment and humans.55 According to
a recent U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) on pesticides in this nation’s
waters, pesticides are often transformed into degradates, which are
compounds “produced from the transformation of a parent pesticide or
another degradate through either abiotic or biotic processes.”56 These
degradates are commonly carried to surrounding areas and cause adverse
impacts to nontarget organisms and to water-related beneficial uses.
Scientific knowledge about the effects of pesticides cannot keep up
with the ability of manufacturers to create new synthetic types, which
contributes to the need for accurate and comprehensive in situ tracking
and monitoring of their use. The 2005 Aquatic Pesticide Monitoring
Program Final Report, which was conducted by the San Francisco
Estuary Institute and evaluated the potential water quality impacts
associated with the application of aquatic pesticides over a three-year
period, notes that “risk quotient exceedances and sediment quality triad
calculations indicate that significant questions remain concerning
potential localized acute impacts and chronic impacts” from aquatic
pesticide applications.57
Government studies show that a large percentage of the nation’s
waterways contain environmentally destructive pesticides.58 More than
one-half of the streams sampled contained pesticide concentrations

55. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THIRD NATIONAL REPORT ON
HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS 349, 369 (2005), available at http://www.
cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf/thirdreport.pdf (discussing health effects of organophosphate
pesticides). Another study report calls into question the ability of spray programs to actually
reduce the risk and transmission of the West Nile virus. Spraying programs may be giving
communities a false sense of security. The report reemphasizes the importance of personal
preventative measures in lowering disease rates. Indira B. Gujral et al., Behavioral Risks
for West Nile Virus Disease, Northern Colorado, 2003, 13 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
419, 424 (2007).
56. ROBERT J. GILLIOM ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1291,
PESTICIDES IN THE NATION’S STREAMS AND GROUND WATER, 1992–2001, at 146 (rev.
2007), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2005/1291/pdf/circ1291.pdf. The USGS
implemented the National Water-Quality Assessment Program to support national,
regional, and local information needs and decisions related to water quality management and
policy. USGS, National Water-Quality Assessment (NAWQA) Program, http://water.usgs.
gov/nawqa/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
57. SIEMERING ET AL., supra note 49, at 1.
58. GILLIOM ET AL., supra note 56, at 8.
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exceeding the EPA guidelines for the protection of aquatic life.59
Systemic herbicides, for example, kill plant-eating insects after being
absorbed from the insect’s stomach after the insect eats the plant
containing the poison.60 The bioaccumulative effect of such pesticides
and their migration throughout the food chain are a concern to many
scientists and citizens. The spiraling quest for newer and improved
pesticides due to target pest adaptation, tolerance, and resistance is the
environmental equivalent of a spiraling arms race.61
Federal as well as state studies document the ubiquity and persistence
of pesticides in the environment.62 Not surprisingly, the USGS reports
that the pesticides detected most frequently in the nation’s waters are
those most frequently used. Pesticides, such as simazine, prometon,
2,4-D, diazinon, and carbaryl, “were frequently found at relatively high
levels in urban streams throughout the Nation.”63 Although some pesticides
have been substantially restricted during or after the study period,
pesticides or their degradates continue to pollute this nation’s waters.64
The USGS has found that “major gaps in critical information” about
pesticide persistence exist, which presents a serious challenge to
scientists, managers, and policymakers.65 Among other recommendations,
it urges: (1) improved tracking of pesticide use; (2) assessment of
pesticides not yet studied because of budget constraints and limitations
of current analytical methods; (3) improved assessment and understanding
of degradates; (4) study of toxicities of pesticide mixtures; and
(5) improved long-term monitoring of a broader range of geographic

59. GREGORY J. FUHRER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1225, THE
QUALITY OF OUR NATION’S WATERS: NUTRIENTS AND PESTICIDES 3–9 (1999), available
at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1225/pdf/index.html.
60. John Harte et al., Toxics A to Z: A Guide to Everyday Pollution Hazards, in
THE REGULATION OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 525, 527 (John S.
Applegate et al. eds., 2000).
61. One author observes that although insecticide use has increased tenfold since
the 1940s, crop losses have doubled. He argues that pesticides never kill 100% of the
pest population, and repeated applications produce highly resistant pest strains. LEVINE,
supra note 5, at 6.
62. The California Department of Pesticide Regulation maintains a Surface Water
Database that contains data for various environmental monitoring studies on pesticides in
California waterways. It is available online. California Department of Pesticide Regulation,
Surface Water Database, http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/emon/surfwtr/surfdata.htm (last
visited Mar. 14, 2010).
63. GILLIOM ET AL., supra note 56, at 10.
64. For example, the uses of diazinon and chlorpyrifos have been substantially
restricted since 2001. Notwithstanding the fact that some organochlorine pesticides have
been discontinued, their persistence continues. Id.
65. Id. at 19.
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locations and pesticides.66 This is not the time for a crabbed construction of
the CWA.
III. THE FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND
RODENTICIDE ACT (FIFRA)
A basic understanding of FIFRA is useful to appreciating the broader
aspects of the pesticide controversy. In 1972, Congress established
FIFRA’s current statutory framework.67 The law was changed from just
protecting consumers from adulterated or improperly labeled pesticides
to one governing pesticide use as well as sale and labeling.68 Congress
also added environmental safety as a factor for pesticide registration.69
Today, FIFRA governs the labeling, distribution, sale, and use of
pesticides sold in the United States.70 Human health and the environmental
concerns are considered during the uniform system of national
registration.71 The manufacturer of any pesticide used to kill any pest is
required to obtain registration of the product from the EPA.72 No person
is allowed to distribute or sell any pesticide not registered in accordance
with the requirements of FIFRA.73 In addition, pesticide users are
required to comply with the labeling conditions.74 Civil and criminal
penalties exist for violating FIFRA.75

66. Id.
67. The history of FIFRA and its evolution is outlined by Linda J. Fisher et al., A
Practitioner’s Guide to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act: Part I,
24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,449, 10,451–52 (1994).
68. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 991–92 (1984).
69. Fisher et al., supra note 67, at 10,452.
70. Under 7 U.S.C. § 136v, “[a] State may regulate the sale or use of any federally
registered pesticide . . . to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use
prohibited by [FIFRA].” 7 U.S.C. § 136v (2006). However, “[s]uch State shall not
impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or
different from those required under [FIFRA].” See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,
544 U.S. 431, 439 (2005) (quoting earlier version of § 136v).
71. FIFRA provides that “[t]he terms ‘protect health and the environment’ and ‘protection
of health and the environment’ mean protection against any unreasonable adverse effects
on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(x) (2006).
72. Id. § 136(u) (defining “pesticide”); id. § 136a(a) (requiring registration of pesticides
prior to sale).
73. Id. § 136a(a).
74. Id. § 136j(a)(2)(G).
75. Id. § 136l.
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In order to register and market a pesticide product, the manufacturer
must submit a proposed label and supporting data on the probable
adverse effects of the product.76 The final rule contains the following
information about FIFRA data submission:
EPA requires a pesticide company to submit a substantial body of data in support of
an application for registration. EPA then supplements this required database
with information obtained through a systematic search of the open literature on the
ecotoxicity of environmental substances. EPA compares the estimated environmental
concentrations expected to result from use of a pesticide with toxicity values
observed in required studies and studies from the open literature. This database
provides sufficient information to conduct assessments of potential ecological
and human health risks, including the identification of toxicologically significant
degradation products and/or metabolites.77

The EPA will register the pesticide if it “will perform its intended
function without unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,”78
which is defined as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environment,
taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs and
benefits of the use of any pesticide.”79
The registration process combines consumer protection through truthin-labeling with an “unreasonable-risk” balancing test that evaluates
product performance and cost-benefit considerations. When the EPA
registers a pesticide, it has balanced the pesticide’s benefits against its
accompanying risks. But regulatory gaps exist. For example, many of
the older pesticides used today and previously approved for use have not
been subject to the full range of tests required for new pesticide products
entering the market today.80

76. Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C), (F).
77. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,489 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C) (2006); accord id. § 136a(c)(5)(D); see also id.
§ 136a(a) (registration requirement); id. § 136(bb) (defining “unreasonable adverse impacts
on the environment”).
79. FIFRA provides:
The term “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” means (1) any
unreasonable risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any pesticide, or
(2) a human dietary risk from residues that result from a use of a pesticide in or
on any food inconsistent with the standard under section 346a of title 21. The
Administrator shall consider the risks and benefits of public health pesticides
separate from the risks and benefits of other pesticides. In weighing any regulatory
action concerning a public health pesticide under this subchapter, the Administrator
shall weigh any risks of the pesticide against the health risks such as the diseases
transmitted by the vector to be controlled by the pesticide.
Id. § 136(bb).
80. LEVINE, supra note 5, at 16.
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The EPA is now reviewing this shortcoming and is requiring
additional testing as part of the reregistration process. Nevertheless,
testing and reregistration is not expected to be completed for years.81
With respect to these older pesticides, one can confidently say that water
quality is not adequately addressed by FIFRA.
A pesticide is considered “misbranded” if its label does not contain
adequate instructions for its use or if the label omits the necessary
warnings or cautionary statements.82 Manufacturers have additional
obligations beyond labeling.83 The EPA specifies the following with the
submission of water quality data for FIFRA pesticide registration:
The Office of Pesticide Programs (OPP), working with the Office of Water,
EPA regions, and state partners, developed the “OPP Standard Operating
Procedure: Inclusion of Water Quality & Impaired Water Body Data in OPP’s
Registration Review Risk Assessment & Management Process.” The SOP
[Standard Operating Procedure] is intended to encourage submission and use of
water quality data during registration review.
To ensure that such data can be used quantitatively or qualitatively in
pesticide risk assessments, data should conform as much as possible to the quality
standards in Appendix A of the SOP. Voluntary submission of these data to
OPP for pesticide cases beginning the registration review process will insure
that Clean Water Act Section 303(d) impaired waterbody listing data, and
other relevant information for these and other water bodies, can be obtained and
considered during the registration review process.
Data may be submitted in advance of opening a pesticide case docket or
during the public comment period on the initial docket. While data may be
submitted later, EPA’s ability to adequately consider late-submitted data will
be limited.84

The FIFRA registration process is not a satisfactory proxy to
regulation under the CWA. FIFRA does not provide a water quality
monitoring system. Thus, it fails to provide the necessary regulatory
structure to ensure that local water quality standards and implementation
plans, which are required expressly by the CWA, are not compromised
or otherwise jeopardized.85 Without an effective system of monitoring,
the effects of the primary toxicant, the “inert” or other stabilizing
chemicals, and the interaction with other pesticides and pollutants in the
ambient or receiving water are unknown. For example, surfactants,
81. Id.
82. 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(1)(F)–(G) (2006).
83. Id. § 136j(a).
84. U.S. EPA, Water Quality Data Submissions for Registration Review (June 19,
2008), http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/registration_review/water_quality.htm.
85. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006).
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which may be added to a pesticide by the applicator immediately before
being applied, may be of an order of magnitude more toxic than the
active ingredient pesticide.86
IV. THE CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA)
The CWA is the principal federal statute dealing with the protection of
water quality.87 Since 2000, the United States Supreme Court has
grappled with eight cases involving the CWA.88 These cases illustrate
the importance of the CWA as well as the controversy surrounding its
application. The National Cotton Council decision is simply another
chapter in this continuing controversy over its application.
The objective of the CWA is “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”89 One of its
goals is to achieve a “water quality which provides for the protection and
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in
and on the water.”90 The widespread use of chemical pesticides potentially
threatens the realization of this national objective.
The CWA contains various regulatory programs aimed at realizing
Congress’s objective. The NPDES point source (PS) program prohibits

86. SIEMERING ET AL., supra note 49, at 1. A surfactant is any substance that when
dissolved in an aqueous solution reduces the surface tension between it and another
liquid. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1186 (10th ed. 1997) (defining
“surfactant” and “surface-active”).
87. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). The other important statute dealing with water
quality is the Safe Drinking Water Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2006). It directs
the EPA to set primary and secondary maximum levels for contaminants in public drinking
water systems. Id. § 300g-1.
88. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1502–03 (2009) (dealing
with cooling water intake structures under section 316(b) of the CWA); Coeur Alaska,
Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458, 2467 (2009) (considering the
regulatory relationship between sections 402 and 404 of the CWA); S.D. Warren Co. v.
Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006) (dealing with section 401 of the CWA
discharge of a pollutant to “navigable waters”); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715,
731–32 (2006) (construing section 404 of the CWA requirement of “navigable waters”
of section 502(7)); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S.
95, 102–05 (2004) (construing the “addition of pollutants” requirement of section
502(12) of the CWA); Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 99,
100 (2002) (per curiam) (addressing section 404 of the CWA discharges), aff’g 261 F.3d
810 (9th Cir. 2001); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001) (considering the Corps’s section 404 of the CWA
jurisdiction over “isolated wetlands” under the Migratory Bird Rule); Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 173 (2000) (interpreting the
“citizen-suit” provisions of section 505 of the CWA).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
90. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
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the discharge of pollutants91 into navigable waters unless authorized by a
properly issued NPDES permit that specifies discharge limits and
imposes affirmative obligations such as monitoring and reporting.92
The NPDES program employs two water quality control strategies to
regulate pollutant discharges: nationally based effluent limits93 and
locally based water quality standards (WQSs).94 Water quality based
effluent limitations set the amount of chemicals and other pollutants
allowed in a defined receiving waterbody,95 whereas nationally based
effluent limits set the amount of chemicals and other pollutants that can
be discharged from a regulated PS,96 which includes any device used to
spray or discharge the pesticide.97
For the NPDES program to apply, the “discharge of a pollutant,”
which is broadly defined as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source,”98 is required.99 When a pesticide is
applied to, over, or near navigable waters, the “addition” requirement is
satisfied because something is being added that otherwise would not be
present.
The CWA contains several definitions important to correctly applying
the law:
The term “pollutant” means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage,
garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive
materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial,
municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water.100

91. The term “discharge of a pollutant” means the “addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12).
92. Id. §§ 1311, 1342. NPDES permit dischargers are required to monitor their
discharges and report the results in Discharge Monitoring Reports submitted to the EPA
or state agency administering the NPDES program. 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4) (2009).
These reports are the backbone to many enforcement actions. See Fairhurst v. Hagener,
422 F.3d 1146, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2005).
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1311.
94. Id. § 1313.
95. See id. § 1312(a).
96. See id. § 1311(a), (e); see also 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2009) (defining “point source”).
97. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). See also League of Wilderness Defenders v.
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1192–93 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the aerial spraying of
pesticides required an NPDES permit).
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2006).
99. See id. § 1342.
100. Id. § 1362(6).
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If the term pollutant was comprehensively defined by those identified
categories, the legal inquiry might be limited to whether pesticides fit
within either the category of chemical wastes or biological materials.
But the phrase “any addition of any pollutant”101 suggests that Congress
intended the term pollutant to include any contaminant affecting the
natural integrity of the nation’s waters.102 This broader view of the term
was the position historically taken by the EPA. For nearly thirty years
prior to the adoption of the final rule, the EPA took the position that
pesticides could not be discharged into “‘lakes, streams, ponds or public
waters unless in accordance with an NPDES permit.’”103
Because pesticides are toxic, the meaning of the term “toxic pollutant”
also is relevant. It is defined as:
[T]hose pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-causing agents,
which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation
into any organism, either directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion
through food chains, will, on the basis of information available to the Administrator,
cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological
malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations,
in such organisms or their offspring.104

The focus in this definition is on the effect of the contaminant.
Included within the meaning of toxic pollutant are “agents, which after
discharge” will cause adverse effects to any organism.105
The toxic pollutant category is intended to be dynamic and to adapt
based on advances in science. For example, section 307 of the CWA,
which deals with toxic and pretreatment effluent standards, provides:
On and after December 27, 1977, the list of toxic pollutants or combination of
pollutants subject to this chapter shall consist of those toxic pollutants listed in
table 1 of Committee Print Numbered 95-30 of the Committee on Public Works and
Transportation of the House of Representatives, and the Administrator shall
publish, not later than the thirtieth day after December 27, 1977, that list. From
time to time thereafter, the Administrator may revise such list and the Administrator
is authorized to add to or remove from such list any pollutant. The Administrator in
publishing any revised list, including the addition or removal of any pollutant
from such list, shall take into account toxicity of the pollutant, its persistence,
degradability, the usual or potential presence of the affected organisms in any
waters, the importance of the affected organisms, and the nature and extent of
the effect of the toxic pollutant on such organisms. A determination of the
Administrator under this paragraph shall be final except that if, on judicial
101. Id. § 1362(12) (defining “discharge of a pollutant”).
102. See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3743.
103. U.S. EPA, Pesticide Regulation (PR) Notice 93-10, Effluent Discharge Labeling
Statements (July 29, 1993) (quoting U.S. EPA’s Policy and Criteria Notice 2180.1 (June
26, 1977)), available at http://www.epa.gov/PR_Notices/pr93-10.pdf.
104. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2006).
105. Id.
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review, such determination was based on arbitrary and capricious action of the
Administrator, the Administrator shall make a redetermination.106

The determination by the Administrator is to be based on a variety of
considerations, including the toxicity of the agent, its persistence and
degradability, the affected organisms in the water and their importance,
and the nature and extent of the effect of the toxic pollutant on such
organisms.107
Two general considerations predominate in section 307.108 The first—
persistence and degradability—focuses on the temporal fate of the toxic
agent. The second—the presence of affected organisms and the effect
on them—broadly focuses on the environmental consequences of the
toxic agent. In addition, this language is similar to the language, “after
discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation into
any organism,” that appears in the definition of toxic pollutant.109
In the 1987 amendments to the CWA, Congress directed the EPA to
identify categories of sources discharging toxic pollutants that had not
been previously published.110 It also required the development of
numerical water quality criteria for toxic pollutants.111 Congress clearly
did not intend the term toxic pollutant to be static. Moreover, Congress,
which focused on the adverse effect to organisms, did not require
consideration be given to whether the toxic agent serves a beneficial
purpose or is registered in accordance with FIFRA. These considerations
apply to the analysis of chemical pesticides.
V. COMPARING FIFRA AND THE CWA
Under the CWA, discharges of pollutants are prohibited without a
permit.112 Neither the purpose of the discharge nor cost-benefit
considerations are relevant to whether an NPDES permit is required.
Under FIRFA, however, these are relevant considerations.113 The CWA
mandates consideration of local WQSs, which include considerations of

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. § 1317(a)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1362(13) (emphasis added).
Id. § 1314(m)(1)(B).
Id. § 1313(c)(2)(B).
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
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chemical constituency,114 whereas FIFRA does not. Finally, complying
with application labeling requirements of FIFRA115 does not protect
against the adverse consequences to local WQSs.
The NPDES program includes a monitoring and reporting program to
ensure compliance with the law.116 In contrast, FIFRA, apart from
providing that the user must comply with label warnings,117 lacks
effective control mechanisms to ensure compliance. The CWA authorizes
citizen suits to promote compliance,118 whereas FIFRA lacks a similar
authorizing provision. Finally, the FIFRA registration process also does
not consider the potential cumulative toxic effect of separately applied
pesticides and their synergistic interaction.119 In short, FIFRA does not
provide an adequate method of protecting local water quality.
VI. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
The EPA administers the NPDES permitting program. Section 402(b)
provides, however, that the EPA “shall approve” transfer of permitting
authority to a state upon application and the showing that the state has
met the specified criteria.120 Most states are authorized to administer the
NPDES program but are subject to continuing administrative oversight
by the EPA.
The Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) sets out the grounds
for the judicial review of agency action. A federal court may overturn
the EPA’s final rule if it is determined to be contrary to the CWA,121
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law,”122 or unconstitutional.123
114. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 76, 82 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2006).
119. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006). The following states have approved programs: Alabama;
Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii;
Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maine; Maryland; Michigan;
Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Jersey; New York;
North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island;
South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington;
West Virginia; Wisconsin; Wyoming. U.S. EPA, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES): State Program Status (Apr. 14, 2003), http://cfpub2.epa.gov/npdes/
statestats.cfm.
121. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006).
122. Id. § 706(2)(A) (2006). See also JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON,
JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 58 (2003).
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A predominant feature of federal administrative law is judicial
deference to agency decisionmaking. It is based on considerations such
as judicial economy, political accountability, and agency expertise on
technical matters. This principle of judicial deference is anchored in the
often cited Supreme Court decision of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.124
In Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth the general principles
applicable to the judicial review of agency rulemaking. The first step
involves the court’s determining whether Congress has clearly spoken to
the issue. If it has, the court will give effect to the clearly expressed
intent of Congress absent some overriding constitutional deficiency. If
Congress’s intent is not clear, the second step involves the court’s
determining whether the agency’s determination is a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.125
As a general matter, an agency’s interpretation is less likely to be
sustained under step one than under step two. One empirical study
found, for example, that agencies’ decisionmaking prevailed 42% of the
time under step one and 89% of the time under step two.126 These
findings reveal that if the issue is reasonably debatable, a court is more
likely to defer to the agency’s determination under step two. The larger
point is that important practical consequences accompany whether a
court undertakes the judicial review under step one or step two.
The methodological difficulty in applying Chevron may be traced to
determining whether Congress has clearly spoken to the issue. The
language used by Congress may be inherently ambiguous, or the ambiguity
may be revealed only after consulting the various interpretations
associated with the language employed, the context of the words when
considered with other parts of the statute, the purpose of the statute, or
Congress’s intent as expressed in the legislative history to the statute.
Therefore, it is not surprising that statutory language is often the slippery
slope to competing constructional arguments advanced by lawyers.
With respect to step two inquiries, courts are assisted by the application
of the principle that an agency is held to a high standard of articulation.

123. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B).
124. 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
125. Id. at 842–43.
126. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 31 (1998).
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In an early decision dealing with the application of FIFRA, Judge
Leventhal emphasized this point:
We recognize that EPA’s functions are difficult and demanding and
are impressed by the thoughtfulness and range of EPA’s general approach; nor
have we any reason to doubt the wisdom and validity of its specific decisions.
But the demand of functions so difficult of decision are accompanied by demands,
equally difficult to meet, for attentive consideration and careful exposition. Our
own responsibility as a court is as a partner in the overall administrative process—
acting with restraint, but providing supervision. We cannot discharge our role
adequately unless we hold EPA to a high standard of articulation. The EPA is
charged with profoundly important tasks; reclamation and preservation of our
environment is a national priority of the first rank. It is not an agency in the
doldrums of the routine or familiar. The importance and difficulty of subject matter
entail special responsibilities when the EPA undertakes to explain and defend its
actions in court.127

VII. PRE-NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL V. EPA CASE LAW
Several courts considered the relationship between pesticides, the
CWA, and FIFRA prior to National Cotton Council. In 2001, for
example, the Ninth Circuit decided Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation
District.128 In this case, the Talent Irrigation District applied an acutely
toxic herbicide, Magnacide H, to an irrigation canal to control weeds and
vegetation. Due to a leaking irrigation gate, the herbicide was released
into a nearby creek where it caused an unintended fish kill of 92,000
juvenile steelhead.129
A nonprofit group brought a citizen suit under the CWA arguing that
the irrigation district had discharged a pollutant without an NPDES
permit. The court agreed. It found that the herbicide was a “pollutant”
within the meaning of the CWA, and thus an NPDES permit was
required.130 It reasoned:
The active ingredient in Magnacide H is acrolein, a toxic chemical that is lethal
to fish at a concentration at and below the level required to kill weeds in the
irrigation canals, and which takes at least several days to break down into a nontoxic
state. Although it would seem absurd to conclude that a toxic chemical directly
poured into water is not a pollutant, we need not decide that issue because we
agree with the district court that the residual acrolein left in the water after its
application qualifies as a chemical waste product and thus as a “pollutant” under
the CWA.131

127. Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 465 F.2d 528, 540–41 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote
omitted) (citation omitted).
128. 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 528.
130. Id. at 532–34.
131. Id. at 532–33.
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The fish kill resulted from the residual chemical waste. The fact that the
pesticide was intended for a beneficial purpose, killing aquatic weeds,
was not controlling.132 Left undecided by the court was whether the
initial application, irrespective of any lingering residue, would require an
NPDES permit. This unanswered question would resurface in National
Cotton Council.
Notwithstanding the court’s observation in Headwaters that “it would
seem absurd to conclude that a toxic chemical poured into the water is
not a pollutant,”133 the EPA subsequently argued that the final rule was
consistent with Headwaters on the theory that the irrigation district
“failed to comply with a FIFRA registration requirement to contain the
herbicide-laden water in an irrigation canal for a specified number of
days.”134
The EPA’s noncompliance claim under FIFRA misses the point that
pesticide toxicity and its effect on water quality are not dependent on
complying with the FIFRA labeling and containment instructions. The
use of a toxic chemical pesticide necessarily affects the surrounding
aquatic environment. Complying with the application requirements of
FIFRA does not ensure, nor is it intended to ensure, the protection of
locally determined water quality standards.
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit decided League of Wilderness Defenders v.
Forsgren.135 The court found that the aerial spraying of a pesticide over
tree covered waters from an airplane fitted with tanks and a mechanical
spraying apparatus was a discharge from a PS.136 The insecticide being
sprayed was used to combat the Douglas Fir Tussock Moth (Tussock
Moth), which kills Douglas Fir trees.137 The court rejected the U.S.
Forest Service’s claim that the aerial spraying should be treated as
nonpoint source pollution (NPS), which does not require an NPDES

132. Id. at 533 (citing Hudson River Fishermen’s Ass’n v. City of New York, 751
F. Supp. 1088, 1101–02 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991)).
133. Headwaters, 243 F.3d at 532–33.
134. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,489 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
122).
135. 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
136. Id. at 1185.
137. Id. at 1182.
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permit.138 This case is distinguishable from Headwaters in that the focus
of analysis was on the method of delivery.
The Ninth Circuit found that the aerial deposition of a pesticide that
drifts into the waterbody is from a PS.139 The argument that it was not
discharged from a PS, or that it did not involve an “addition,” was
rejected by the court. Spraying a pesticide aerially over water and
discharging the same pesticide directly onto or into the water were
treated as functionally equivalent. Otherwise, the CWA easily could be
avoided simply by attaching an airborne sprayer to a PS to avoid
regulation.
Although the court stated that the parties did not dispute the fact that
the insecticide was a pollutant,140 the EPA subsequently challenged this
conclusion. The EPA stated in the final rule, which was issued after
Forsgren, that “the United States expressly reserved its arguments on
that issue [whether the insecticide was a pollutant] in its brief to the
District Court.”141 Therefore, the EPA sought to finesse the court’s
statement on procedural grounds.
Notwithstanding the EPA’s procedural argument, the court had a
sound basis for its view that the insecticide was a pollutant. This
conclusion is evident in the court’s analysis of the harmful spillover
effects associated with the insecticide:
The record reveals a number of harmful side effects associated with the aerial
spraying program. Insecticide will drift outside of the area targeted for spraying
and may kill beneficial species, including butterflies. Because aircraft conducting
the spraying discharge insecticides directly above streams, stoneflies and other
aquatic insects may be affected, reducing food supplies for salmon and other
fish. The spraying could also adversely affect birds and plants.142

The fact that the pesticide might have had some intended beneficial
purpose, such as eradicating the Tussock Moth, did not forestall the
court from also recognizing that the pesticide had other recognizable
adverse environmental consequences.

138. Id. at 1184–85. NPSs may be brought within the NPDES permit program
through the storm water provisions of section 402(p). 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2006).
139. Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1185; see also Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
305, 308 (1982) (holding that airplanes accidently or deliberately dropping bombs into the
sea, as well as Navy ships firing at marine targets, are PSs within the meaning of the
CWA).
140. Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1184 n.2.
141. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,485 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
122).
142. Forsgren, 309 F.3d at 1183.
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In 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided Fairhurst v. Hagener.143 It suggested
that the chemical pesticide antimycin, when applied intentionally in
accordance with the FIFRA label, might require an NPDES permit.144
The court noted that the parties did not assert that any residual chemicals
were left in the water. The parties did not contest that following the
application of the pesticide, the antimycin dissipated rapidly and left no
residue.145
The court constructed several conditions that must be met to avoid
NPDES regulation. The pesticide must (1) be applied for a beneficial
purpose, (2) be applied in compliance with FIFRA, (3) produce no
pesticide residue, and (4) produce no unintended effects.146 Should any
of these identified conditions fail to be met, the chemical pesticide user
would be subject to NPDES regulation.
The court focused on a “plain meaning analysis of the phrase
‘chemical waste.’”147 Because the pesticide antimycin was not, in the
court’s view, a chemical waste, its use was not subject to an NPDES
permit.148 The court did not explain why the term “any pollutant” should
not be more broadly controlling.
The Fairhurst test leaves important questions unresolved. For
example, the court provides no guidance on how or when these technical
decisions, such as the existence of a residue, the time frame for
dissipation, or unintended effects, should be determined. This leaves
pesticide users, regulators, and the public without sufficient guidance.
One point, however, is clear. The court gave short shrift to the
defendant’s argument that an NPDES permit was unnecessary solely
“because he was in compliance with the requirements of FIFRA.”149 In
response to this stand-alone FIFRA compliance contention, the court
skeptically noted that “this argument is explicitly foreclosed by
Headwaters.”150

143. 422 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a pesticide applied to a river
aimed at eliminating pestilent fish species is not a pollutant for purposes of the CWA).
144. See id. at 1150–51.
145. Id. at 1149.
146. Id. at 1150.
147. Id. at 1149; see also id. at 1151 (noting parties stipulated the application was in
accordance with the FIFRA label).
148. Id. at 1150–51.
149. Id. at 1151.
150. Id.
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Under the Fairhurst test, any part of a pesticide that reaches beyond
the intended target may be considered to result in a “residue.”
Moreover, any pesticide affecting the water quality needed to support
nontarget organisms would produce “unintended effects.” Viewed
through this lens of interpretation, all chemical pesticides are potentially
subject to CWA regulation.
VIII. NATIONAL COTTON COUNCIL V. EPA
In National Cotton Council, the Sixth Circuit endorsed the broad
meaning of the term pollutant.151 It reasoned that the plain language of
“chemical waste” and “biological materials” unambiguously applies to
pesticides, and that Chevron deference to the EPA’s rulemaking did not
apply.152 Consequently, the court vacated the EPA’s final rule. It did
not, however, consider the challenge based on the APA or base its
decision on the relationship between the CWA and FIFRA.153
The court reasoned that “[t]he EPA properly argues that excess
chemical pesticides and chemical pesticide residues, rather than all
chemical pesticides, are pollutants.”154 It accepted the EPA’s claim that
not all chemical pesticides are pollutants. The court relied on the plain
meaning analysis of the word “waste” as reflected in commonly used
dictionary definitions: “We cannot conclude that all chemical pesticides
require NPDES permits” because only waste is covered by the category
“chemical waste.”155
According to the court, chemical pesticides are treated as chemical
waste in two instances. One occurs when there is either an excessive or
over application of the pesticide to the land, which finds its way to the
waterbody, or when there is an airborne application over or near the
water. The court described these circumstances:
[A] chemical pesticide is initially applied to land or dispersed in the air—these
pesticides are sometimes referred to as either “terrestrial pesticides” or “aerial
pesticides” and include applications “above” or “near” waterways. At some

151. Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 937 (6th Cir. 2009).
152. Id. at 936.
153. Id. at 940.
154. Id. The court accurately states the EPA’s position that residues are pollutants.
This statement is, however, potentially misleading of the EPA’s regulatory position. The
EPA also claimed that the residues were not subject to NPDES regulation. Thus, residues
may be pollutants, but they are not subject to the NPDES permit program because of the
PS requirement.
155. Id. at 936. The court cites the definitions of waste found in BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1621 (8th ed. 2004) and THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1447 (1981).
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point following application, excess pesticide or residual pesticide finds its way
into the navigable waters of the United States. Pesticides applied in this way
and later affecting the water are necessarily “discarded,” “superfluous,” or “excess”
chemical. Such chemical pesticide residuals meet the Clean Water Act’s definition
of “chemical waste.”156

Although this situation is fact dependent, it is apt to encompass many
situations.
The second occurs when there is a lingering pesticide residue after the
pesticide’s intended purpose has been completed:
In the second circumstance, a chemical pesticide is applied directly and purposefully
to navigable waters to serve a beneficial purpose—such pesticides are often referred
to as “aqueous” or “aquatic” pesticides. As contemplated by the EPA, if residual
aquatic pesticide “remain[s] in the water after the application and [the pesticide’s]
intended purpose has been completed,” then the residue would likewise qualify
as a “chemical waste.” As such, these chemical wastes would unambiguously fall
within the ambit of the Clean Water Act.157

The argument that pesticides applied in compliance with FIFRA were
not “pollutants” was rejected by the Sixth Circuit.158 If a pesticide
residue exists, the CWA applies regardless of FIFRA compliance.
The court’s rejection of the idea that all chemical pesticides are not
subject to regulation is problematic. It fails to recognize that the
chemical components reaching beyond the targeted organism are waste.
Aquatic pesticides, it should be recalled, are broadly applied over a wide
area.159 Chemicals that affect nontargeted organisms fit within a plain
meaning definition of waste.
These waste chemicals or byproducts also fit within the meaning of the
CWA’s definition of pollution.160 This approach to broadly conceptualizing
chemical waste takes into consideration the common meaning of the
term pollutant and is consistent with the purpose of the CWA. In Sierra
Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., for example, the Fifth Circuit observed:

156. Nat’l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 936–37.
157. Id. at 937 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
158. Id. at 929–30. A FIFRA labeling requirement governing application rates or
dilution requirements is related to water quality, whereas the FIFRA requirement that the person
mixing the pesticide wear protective clothing, while a violation is not related to water
quality. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA,
71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,486 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
159. See supra notes 3–6 and accompanying text.
160. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2006).
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Despite the absence of an indisputable catch-all (e.g., “any other waste whatever”),
there is little doubt that the recitation of categories in the definition of “pollutant” is
designed to be suggestive not exclusive. In the 1972 amendments, Congress meant
to carry on the tradition of the Refuse Act, and that tradition was to construe the
word “refuse” as condemning each and every variation of damage-inducing wastes
that changing technologies could invent. This interpretation is endorsed by United
States v. Hamel, [551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977),] which condemns a discharge of
gasoline as within a generic understanding of “pollutant,” rather than stretch the
less inclusive “biological materials” to cover organically-based petroleum compounds.
That the definition of “pollutant” is meant to leave out very little is confirmed
by the statutory definition of “pollution,” which means nothing less than the
“man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and
radiological integrity of water.”161

As a result, the discharge of any chemical pesticide that affects the
water quality of the waterbody fits the plain meaning of a damage-inducing
waste. The statutory laundry list of “bads,” which includes chemical
wastes and biological materials, is more encompassing than the two
situations identified by the Sixth Circuit in National Cotton Council.162
The view that all chemical pesticides should be subject to CWA
regulation also derives support from the definition of toxic pollutant,
which focuses on adverse effects. A toxic pollutant is considered to
“cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations,
physiological malfunctions . . . or physical deformations” in any organism.163
The CWA clearly states that the “discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful” unless the discharge is in compliance with
various sections of the CWA.164 The reference to “any pollutant,” when
paired with the meaning of “toxic pollutant,” means that the term
pollutant should be broadly conceptualized to include all chemical
pesticides.165 Pesticides are not specifically exempted by any provision
of the CWA.
A reliable system of monitoring is essential to enforcing and
substantiating CWA violations. The potential exposure to liability may
161. Sierra Club v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546, 565–66 (5th Cir. 1996)
(alteration in original) (quoting 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR
AND WATER 144 (1986)).
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (defining “pollutant”).
163. Id. § 1362(13).
164. Id. § 1311(a) (emphasis added) (effluent limitations); see also id. § 1312
(water quality effluent limitations); id. § 1316 (national standards of performance); id.
§ 1317 (toxic and pretreatment effluent standards); id. § 1328 (aquaculture); id. § 1342
(NPDES); id. § 1344 (permits for dredge and fill material).
165. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107, 110 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1977) (concluding
that the CWA covers, at a minimum, those pollutants covered under the Refuse Act,
which applies to “all foreign substances” not explicitly exempted from coverage); see also,
e.g., Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 565 (finding that “the breadth of many of the items in the
list of ‘pollutants’ tends to eviscerate any restrictive effect”).
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encourage many pesticide users to secure the necessary permitting, but
this result is not ensured. Bringing all chemical pesticides within the
permitting program in the first instance is consistent with the goal of
controlling pollution at the source. It is also consistent with Congress’s
definition of “pollution,” which broadly consists of “man-made or maninduced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and radiological
integrity of water.”166 Given the persistent nature of pesticides in this
nation’s waters, chemical pesticides properly fit within this definition.
A. Pesticides and Point Sources
In the final rule, the EPA argued that when a pesticide is transformed
over time from a beneficial product into a chemical waste, the
transformed pollutant should be treated as being from an NPS and not
from a PS.167 As a result, the EPA argued that the transformed pollutant
should not be subject to the NPDES program, “[e]ven though the
pesticide may become a ‘pollutant’ at a later time . . . a[n NPDES]
permit is not required for its application because it did not meet both
statutory prerequisites ([being a] pollutant and [from a] point source) at
the time of its discharge into the water.”168
According to the EPA, the transformed pollutant problem should be
dealt with as a “nonpoint source pollutant” under the Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) program, which is a remedial program designed to
rectify a water pollution problem after the fact.169 The focus of a TMDL
is on correcting a specific water pollutant problem after it has been
identified through a technical study. From a policy perspective,
controlling the sources of pollution before they become or add to a
pollution problem is the preferable water quality strategy rather than
dealing with the problem after the fact through the TMDL program.
To be effective, the TMDL program requires regulators to identify the
sources of pollution contributing to the water quality impairment. This
determination is administratively difficult without an effective monitoring
program to identify the pesticide users who have discharged the
166.
167.
FIFRA,
122).
168.
169.

33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2006).
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,487 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
Id.
Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006).
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pesticides to the impaired water quality segment. Finger pointing
amongst potentially responsible discharging pesticide parties is likely.
The refrain “I’m not the source of the chemical pollution impairment,
it’s someone else” is inevitable.
Relying on the TMDL program suffers another shortcoming. NPDES
permits generally are not available to implement TMDLs when the NPS
contributes or is the sole source of the water quality impairment for a
straightforward reason: only a PS is subject to NPDES permitting
requirements.170
Other regulatory strategies must be used to plug this regulatory gap.171
The EPA argued the NPDES storm water program is available.172 It
maintained:
[P]esticides are waste materials, and therefore pollutants under the [CWA], when
contained in a waste stream, including storm water regulated under section
402(p) or other industrial or municipal discharges. In those circumstances, an
NPDES permit may be required if the pesticides are discharged into a water of
the United States from a point source.173

Discharges are considered as being either from a PS or an NPS.174
The CWA defines PS as “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance” from which “pollutants are or may be discharged.”175
Anything not within the meaning of a PS is by definition considered an
NPS.176
The definition of PS says “pollutants are or may be discharged.”177
The fundamental idea underlying the meaning of a PS is that the source
is susceptible to control by an identifiable and responsible party.178

170. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
171. See John H. Minan, The San Diego River: A Natural, Historic, and Recreational
Resource, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1139, 1171–75 (2004).
172. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3) (2006). In 1987, Congress made storm water
discharges from Municipal Separate Storm Sewer Systems (MS4s) and industrial storm
water PSs for purposes of NPDES regulation. See generally John H. Minan, Municipal
Storm Water Permitting in California, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245, 248–52 (2003).
173. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487.
174. See generally U.S. EPA, NONPOINT SOURCE PROGRAM AND GRANTS GUIDANCE
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 AND FUTURE YEARS (1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/
owow/nps/guide.html.
175. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006). Expressly excluded from the definition of PS
are agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 370–74 (10th Cir.
1979) (holding leaching overflow from a gold mine operation that caused a fish kill was
a PS on the theory of controllability).
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Pesticide applications clearly are controllable at the source by the
discharger.
The Sixth Circuit properly rejected the portion of the final rule that
placed a temporal or timing requirement on the discharge. A pesticide that
transmogrifies into a chemical waste or leaves a residue with the passage
of time is subject to NPDES permitting. The court correctly reasoned:
The EPA’s attempt at temporally tying the “addition” (or “discharge”) of the
pollutant to the “point source” does not follow the plain language of the Clean
Water Act. Injecting a temporal requirement to the “discharge of a pollutant” is
not only unsupported by the Act, but it is also contrary to the purpose of the
permitting program, which is “to prevent harmful discharges into the Nation’s
waters.” If the EPA’s interpretation were allowed to stand, discharges that are
innocuous at the time they are made but extremely harmful at a later point
would not be subject to the permitting program. Further, the EPA’s interpretation
ignores the directive given to it by Congress in the Clean Water Act, which is to
protect water quality. As the EPA itself recognizes, “Congress generally
intended that pollutants be controlled at the source whenever possible.”179

Although the court refused to go so far, its reasoning about harmful
discharges applies with equal force to all chemical pesticides that reach
beyond the immediate target.
B. Biological Materials
The EPA argued that the statutory category of “biological materials”
excluded biological pesticides from the NPDES permit program that are
applied consistently with FIFRA requirements.180 Several threads to the
argument can be isolated. First, the EPA maintained that treating
biological pesticides differently from chemical pesticides “[was] not
warranted.”181 The two types of pesticides should be treated similarly on
the theory that this result was consistent with Congress’s intent. The
EPA also argued that as matter of policy biological materials applied
according to the labeling instructions of FIFRA “are generally reducedrisk products” when compared to many chemical wastes.182

179. Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 939 (6th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
180. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,486–87 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122).
181. Id. at 68,486.
182. Id.
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Of course, to the extent that the exemption for chemical pesticides is
unavailable, the EPA’s similar treatment argument for the exemption
largely collapses. The claim is further weakened by the EPA’s admission
that it is “not surprising that Congress failed to discuss whether
biological pesticides were covered by the [CWA].”183
At its core, the argument assumes that pairing the statutory term
“biological materials” with the term “chemical wastes” effectively
shrinks the meaning of biological materials to mean that only biological
waste is subject to NPDES regulation. This view defies the plain meaning
of the text.
As recognized by the EPA, the term “biological materials” was not
defined by Congress.184 To the extent that meaning is to be ascertained,
the constructional principle noscitur a sociis—“it is known by its
associates”—may be consulted.185 In Association to Protect Hammersley,
Eld, and Totten Inlets v. Taylor Resources, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
recently concluded:
[T]he more specific items in the illustrative list of pollutants, such as
“radioactive materials,” “wrecked or discarded equipment,” “garbage,” “sewage
sludge,” “solid waste,” and “incinerator residue” support an understanding of the
more general statutory term, “biological materials,” as waste material of a human or
industrial process.
. . . But it must also be acknowledged that the phrase “biological materials”
could literally embrace the emissions at issue. For this reason, the statute is
ambiguous on whether “biological materials” means all biological matter
regardless of quantum and nature and regardless of whether generated by living
creatures, or whether the term is limited to biological materials that are a waste
product of some human process. In light of this ambiguity, we consider the
congressional intent in passing the Clean Water Act.186

The constructional principle noscitur a sociis is no help absent some
common features to extrapolate.187 The claim that the term pollutant
ought to be applied only to wastes is at odds with the fundamental
purposes of the CWA. The term pollutant is not consistent in its
references to waste. In some instances the term waste is used as a
noun—“chemical waste.” Other times waste is not used in the definition

183. Id.
184. See Ass’n to Protect Hammersley, Eld & Totten Inlets v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299
F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting the ambiguous term biological
materials when applied to mussel shells and mussel byproducts).
185. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1087 (8th ed. 2004).
186. Ass’n to Protect Hammersley, 299 F.3d at 1016.
187. S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 379–80 (2006).
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of pollutant, but may be implied as a noun—“sewage.” Other times it is
not clear that waste has any relevance—“rock” and “sand.”188
The constructional guide expressio unius est exclusio alterius—the
expression of one excludes others—may also be consulted.189 Congress
provides two specific exclusions from the term pollutant: sewage from
vessels and certain materials associated with oil and gas production.190
Sewage is arguably a waste, but materials to facilitate oil and gas
production may or may not be a waste.
One inference is that Congress limited the other exclusions from the
term pollutant, and the identified exclusions ought to be strictly
construed. Based on this reasoning, biological pesticides, regardless of
beneficial use and regulation under FIFRA, should be treated as
biological materials and not be exempt.191
The constructional principle in pari materia—part of the same
material—counsels that legislation should be interpreted by the courts so
that the respective parts of the law are construed in an internally
consistent manner.192 Congress defined the term toxic pollutant. Because
pesticides are clearly toxic, this term is relevant. It includes the
following pollutants, or combinations of pollutants:
[D]isease-causing agents, which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion,
inhalation or assimilation into any organism, either directly from the environment or
indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will, on the basis of information
available to the Administrator, cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities,
cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in
reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring.193

As previously discussed, the emphasis is on the effect of the agent on
any organism, and not on whether the agent has a beneficial purpose.194
The final rule considered several federal court decisions in which
biological materials were treated as “pollutants.”195 One case, for

188. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2006).
189. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
190. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
191. A “biological pesticide” is “[a] chemical which is derived from plants, fungi,
bacteria, or other non-man-made synthesis.” U.S. EPA, Pesticides: Glossary (June 6,
2007), http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/glossary/.
192. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 807 (8th ed. 2004).
193. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (2006).
194. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text.
195. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,487 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
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example, was Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v.
Southview Farm.196 The EPA argued the biological materials “were
waste materials discharged from a point source.”197 The liquid manure
or “biological material” was being used as a fertilizer, and the excess
applications of the manure were treated as a pollutant under the CWA.198
Nevertheless, a paradox exists with respect to the EPA’s treatment of
a “concentrated animal feeding operation” (CAFO), such as the one
being regulated in Southview Farm. The EPA has promulgated its rule
for the regulation of CAFOs, including the requirement that they apply
for an NPDES permit as point sources.199 The EPA treats the use of
biological materials—fertilizers—by CAFOs as a pollutant for purposes
of NPDES regulation. One might arguably classify the fertilizer as
agricultural waste to escape the paradox, but based on the EPA’s
reasoning, it ought not to be treated as a waste because the fertilizer is
being applied for a beneficial purpose.
The court in National Cotton Council rejected the EPA’s reasoning
that biological pesticides were exempt. It reasoned:
The plain, unambiguous nature of [biological materials] compels this Court to
find that matter of a biological nature, such as biological pesticides, qualifies as a
biological material and falls under the Clean Water Act if it is “discharged into water.”
....
. . . Congress purposefully included the term “biological materials,” rather
than a more limited term such as “biological wastes.” Congress could easily
have drafted the list of pollutants in the Clean Water Act to include “chemical
wastes” and “biological wastes.” But, here, the word “waste” does not accompany
“biological materials.” Thus, if we are to give meaning to the word “waste” in
“chemical waste,” we must recognize Congress’s intent to treat biological and
chemical pesticides differently.200

122). The rule considered, among others, United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories,
Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 645 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding glass vials of human blood placed into a
river were “biological materials”), and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1988) (determining that “live fish, dead fish[,]
and fish remains” discharged into Lake Michigan after live fish were pulled through dam’s
turbines “are pollutants within the meaning of the CWA, since they are biological
materials”).
196. 34 F.3d 114, 117–19 (2d Cir. 1994) (focusing on the meaning of point source
and the exemption of storm water agricultural discharges under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
197. Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,487 (citing Southview Farm).
198. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 116, 117–19.
199. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitation Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations
(CAFOs), 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7176 (Feb. 12, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9,
122, 123, 412). But see Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 524 (2d Cir.
2005) (vacating key parts of the regulation).
200. Nat’l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 937, 938 (6th Cir. 2009).
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In the end, the court treated biological and chemical pesticides differently
based on its view of Congress’s intent. The court states that a biological
pesticide “undeniably alters” the biological integrity of the water.201
But, of course, the same can be said about chemical pesticides
undeniably altering the chemical integrity of the water.
IX. CONCLUSION
Aquatic pesticides are used to eradicate or control pests in, near, or
over waterbodies or wetlands. The principal federal law regulating the
discharge of pollutants to this nation’s water is the Clean Water Act
(CWA), which is administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). The statute defines the term pollutant to include, among
other listed categories, chemical wastes and biological materials.
Although pesticides are not specifically mentioned, the term pollutant
has been broadly construed by some courts to include “all foreign
substances” not expressly exempted from coverage. In addition, the
term pollutant is sufficiently broad to include all chemical pesticides.
In 2006, the EPA issued its final aquatic pollutant rule. It provided
that the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
permit program of the CWA did not apply to chemical or biological
pesticides so long as the pesticide application complied with the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
The EPA’s rule set off a tsunami of legal challenges in the federal
circuits that were consolidated in the Sixth Circuit in National Cotton
Council v. EPA. In January 2009, the Sixth Circuit vacated the EPA’s
final rule. In June 2009, the court granted the EPA a two-year stay of its
mandate to give the EPA the chance to revise its rule to make it
consistent with the court’s opinion. During the stay, the EPA plans to
issue a general NPDES permit for covered pesticide applications.
The question of statutory construction in National Cotton Council is
whether the term pollutant, as used by Congress in the CWA, includes
chemical and biological pesticides when they are applied to waters of the
United States, including wetlands. The issue is not whether chemical
pesticides should or should not be used. Rather, it is whether they
should be regulated as pollutants under the CWA.

201.

Id. at 938.
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As argued in this Article, the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning that the CWA
does not apply to all chemical pesticides is flawed. The court’s view
that the CWA applies only to situations involving over applications and
lingering pesticide residues is too narrow a construction of the CWA.
As a result, the EPA’s revised rules will be misguided by the court’s
decision. As a result, additional legal challenges are sure to follow.
At the time of application, all aquatic chemical pesticides inherently
contain waste because they inexorably reach beyond the intended target
in the same way that air pollution inevitably impacts air quality. Broad
spectrum, narrowly designed, and systemic pesticides have ubiquitous
spillover effects. These spillovers to the aquatic environment are
immediate and satisfy the plain meaning of the term waste. In addition,
all chemical pesticides also fit within a broad meaning of the discharge
of a pollutant because they necessarily affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the waterbody. Impacting the aquatic environment in
this manner is consistent with the view that all chemical pesticides
constitute the discharge of a pollutant.
Congress intentionally defined the term pollutant broadly so as to
avoid litigation over whether the discharge of chemicals would be subject to
NPDES regulation. Congress’s goal is to protect the aquatic environment.
Yet the Sixth Circuit’s decision encourages exactly the type of litigation
that Congress intended to forestall. Under the court’s reasoning, the
focus will be on after-the-fact inquiries, which is the type of technically
complicated proof-based inquiry Congress wanted to avoid.
Congress’s broad approach to defining the term pollutant is evidenced
by the fact that the CWA contains only two specific exemptions within
the definition itself, one for sewage from vessels and the other for
materials associated with the secondary recovery of oil or gas
production. These limited exceptions forcefully indicate that Congress
did not intend a narrow interpretation of pollutant.
Finally, the view that all chemical pesticides are subject to the CWA is
supported by sound policy considerations. Regulating the chemical
pesticides that enter this nation’s waters is critical to protecting water
quality. The existence of legacy pesticide pollutants in this nation’s
waters is well documented. The NPDES program is potentially the only
federal regulatory program for controlling, monitoring, and tracking the
discharge of all chemical pesticides. The intended beneficial purpose of
eradicating or controlling pests does not alter the need to regulate their
use under the CWA.
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